Erv,
I've been
enjoying surfing your website--it brings back a lot of fond
memories! I
was in the 87th FIS during the time that 57-0230 was
damaged during a landing
accident at Charleston AFB SC. Here's the
story:
The
airplane was on a two-ship cross-country flight, taxiing for
takeoff at
Warner-Robins AFB GA. During the taxi, the lower collar of
the left
landing gear sidebrace fractured and fell onto the taxiway.
This was not
noticed by the pilot as no warning lights illuminated. The
takeoff was
normal until gear retraction, when the landing gear did not
retract
fully. When the landing gear was extended, the left main
landing gear
hyperextended against the left external fuel tank. The
pilot elected to
divert to Charleston AFB SC, where the 87th FIS had an
alert
detachment. Fuel was burned off after the relatively short trip
from
Atlanta to Charleston, and the airplane was set up for an approach
end
arrestment. Despite the pilot's best efforts, he was unable to hold
the
left wing up after touchdown, and the left main landing gear
collapsed
outboard. The nose gear was broken off by the force of the
derotation
impact, and the airplane slid to a stop on the runway on the
left external
fuel tank, the radome, and the right main wheel. The
pilot shut down
the engine and egressed the airplane safely. The
airplane never flew
again under its own power.
I was the investigating officer for the
mishap as I was the 87th FIS
Chief of Safety. As the mishap was
investigated, it became clear that
if replacement value was used for parts,
the mishap would become a Class
B (I think between $100K and $500K at the
time). However, since the
airplane was within months of being sent to
AMARC anyways, the costs
used were sheet metal costs, which were relatively
inexpensive. In
order to remove any potential for undue commander's
influence, I was
replaced as the investigator by the 24th NORAD Region Chief
of Safety,
who found that the pilot had done everything possible to
minimize
damage. This was the first time that this exact mishap had
happened in
the F-106 community, although it had essentially the same
symptoms as
Main Landing Gear Boss Pin Failure, which had happened
before. It was
an indication that the F-106 had reached the end of its
life from a
structural lifetime of key components standpoint. The
components were
originally designed for a 4,000 hour lifetime; they were
being used with
over 6,000 hours on the airplanes. The engineering had
been
conservative, but not that conservative!
I've Bcc'd the
pilot of 57-0230 for the landing mishap to see if he
wants to add anything to
my narrative. Once again, thanks for the
memories!
Doug
Benjamin
737 Senior Project Pilot
Boeing Commercial
Airplanes
206-655-0502